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EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE
ACT-PAVING THE WAY FOR
LEGISLATIVE CHANGE
Louise L. Hill*
The Equal Access to Justice Act of 1980, providing attorneys'fees and expenses to
eligible prevailing parties in suits against the United States, had a tumultuous, three-
year life span. During that short time, numerous interpretive questions under the Act
plagued the courts, including what constituted a "prevailing party, " "substantial jus-
tification, " "special circumstances, " the "position of the United States, " and a 'final
judgment" for purposes of the Act. As the courts grappled with these and related
questions, Congress busily drafted 1984 amendments to clarify and extend the Act.
After several attempts, the new legislation was finally passed by Congress, only to be
vetoed by President Reagan. Both Congress and the President, however, remained
committed to the Act's eventual reauthorization. Analysis of the defunct Act and its
judicial interpretations, the proposed 1984 amendments, and the President's objec-
tions thereto provides the foundation for analyzing the 1985 legislation recently
enacted.
INTRODUCTION
THE EQUAL ACCESS to Justice Act' (EAJA or the Act),
promulgated in 1980, permitted parties prevailing against the
United States in certain administrative proceedings and judicial ac-
tions to recover attorneys' fees and associated expenses.2 The Act,
effective October 1, 1981, 3 included a three-year sunset provision,
thereby automatically terminating on October 1, 1984.' During
that three-year period, a variety of courts and agencies considered
numerous petitions for fee awards and expenses, striving to inter-
* Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Toledo. B.A., Pennsylvania State
University (1970); M.Ed., Boston University (1972); J.D., Suffolk University (1978).
1. Pub. L. No. 96-481, 94 Stat. 2325 (1980) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 504 (1982) and 28
U.S.C. § 2412 (1982)) (repealed 1984).
2. The United States is normally immune from suit except as it consents to be sued.
United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941). In effect, EAJA serves as a partial
waiver of sovereign immunity since, by enacting EAJA, the United States consented to be
sued for attorneys' fees and expenses. To effect this partial waiver of sovereign immunity,
Congress created 5 U.S.C. § 504, amended 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and repealed FED. R. Civ. P.
37(0. The latter prohibited an award of attorneys' fees against the United States in the ab-
sence of statutory authorization. See EAJA § 205(a), 94 Stat. at 2330.
3. EAJA, § 208, 94 Stat. at 2330.
4. EAJA, §§ 203(c), 204(c), 94 Stat. at 2327, 2329.
EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT
pret their Congressional mandate.5 A review of the resulting court
decisions reveals diverse interpretations of certain provisions of the
Act.
In October of 1984, Congress passed legislation to modify
EAJA, extending it on a permanent basis.6 However, on November
8, 1984, President Reagan vetoed the new legislation, stating that
certain changes in EAJA failed to further the basic principles of the
Act and were inconsistent with principles of good government.7
Although the President expressed a firm commitment to the policies
underlying EAJA and stated he hoped to approve reauthorization
in the future,8 his veto had the immediate effect of terminating the
Act in light of the October 1, 1984, sunset provision.9
Although the proposed 1984 amendments to EAJA were not
enacted into law, they are instructive for two reasons. First, in
drafting them, Congress explained many provisions of the Act, a
number of which were those subject to disparate judicial interpreta-
tions. Since the original Act remains applicable to those cases com-
5. In general, a federal agency or department conducting an adversary adjudication is
required, in certain circumstances, to award attorneys' fees and other expenses to a party
prevailing against the United States. 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(2). The prevailing party must submit
an application for an award to the agency within thirty days of final judgment. Id. A party
dissatisfied with the outcome of its award application may obtain judicial review of the unsat-
isfactory decision by filing a petition for leave to appeal with the federal court which would
have jurisdiction to review the merits of the underlying agency decision. Id. § 504(c)(2).
Certain prevailing parties against the United States in civil actions may also apply for an
award of attorneys' fees and expenses within thirty days of final judgment by submitting an
application to the court which entertained the action. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). For pur-
poses of an EAJA award with respect to matters commenced in the United States Court of
Claims prior to the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat.
25, both the United States Claims Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit have jurisdiction. See, eg., Morris Mechanical Enters. v. United States, 728
F.2d 497, 498 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Ellis v. United States, 711 F.2d 1571, 1574-75 (Fed. Cir.
1983).
6. See 130 CONG. REC. H12171-74 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984). Passed two weeks after
the Act's automatic termination, the amendments applied retroactively to October 1, 1984.
Id. at H12173. Although the initial version of the amendments as submitted by the Commit-
tee on the Judiciary was approved by the United States House of Representatives on Septem-
ber 11, 1984, H.R. 5479, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984), extended debate surrounding certain
provisions delayed full Congressional approval until October 11, 1984. See 130 CONG. REC.
HI 1479-82 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1984); 130 CONG. REC. H9297-02 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1984);
H.R. REP. No. 992, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). It is interesting to note that the version of
the bill ultimately approved by Congress constituted a "Senate amendment to the House
amendment to the Senate amendments with an amendment." See 130 CONG. REC. H12171
(daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984).
7. See Memorandum of Disapproval of H.R. 5479, 20 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
1814-15 (Nov. 8, 1984).
8. Id.
9. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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menced prior to the October 1, 1984 repeal date,' ° the proposed
amendments offer guidance to the judiciary in the Act's implemen-
tation. Second, the proposed amendments offer insight to the impe-
tus behind the 1985 legislation passed by Congress on July 24,
1985,1" and signed into law by the President on August 5.12
This Article first examines provisions of EAJA as originally en-
acted, highlighting the ambiguities subject to diverse judicial inter-
pretation.' 3 The Article will then compare the original Act with
the proposed 1984 amendments, noting the effect the proposed leg-
islation would have had on the resolution of those disputed inter-
pretations. It examines the President's specific objections to the
1984 proposed legislation, as well as their resolution in the 1985
legislation. Finally, it discusses the continued ambiguities and
problems inherent in this legislation.
I. THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT As ENACTED IN 1981
A. General Provisions
The fundamental purpose of EAJA is to enable those who might
otherwise be unable to afford it an opportunity to assert their rights
against unreasonable government action. Because individuals and
small businesses are often deterred from exercising their legal rights
due to the expense involved, Congress established this general statu-
tory authorization for the award of attorneys' fees and related ex-
penses to eligible prevailing parties in actions involving the Federal
government. 4 EAJA allows recovery of fees and expenses in al-
most all administrative and judicial civil proceedings involving the
government, 15 creating a significant exception to the "American
10. Id.
11. See 131 CONG. REC. S9991 (daily ed. July 24, 1985).
12. Extension of the Equal Access to Justice Act, 21 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 966-
67 (Aug. 12, 1985). The extension as enacted is Pub. L. 99-80 (1985).
13. This Article focuses upon judicial decisions relating to applications for attorneys'
fees and expense awards in civil actions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412, rather than on awards
sought under 5 U.S.C. § 504 of the Administrative Procedure Act. Although the Article
refers to legislation dealing with administratively adjudicated matters, evaluation of agency
adjudications is beyond the scope of this Article.
14. See H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4984, 4988.
15. Tort cases, with the exception of constitutionally based torts, were specifically ex-
cluded from coverage, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), since the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28
U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (1982), provided adequate remedies. See H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note
14, at 18, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4984, 4997.
Proceedings subject to § 7430 of the Internal Revenue Code were also excluded under the
Act. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(e). Section 7430, enacted as part of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Respon-
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Rule" in which litigants are responsible for paying their own attor-
neys' fees and expenses irrespective of the litigation's outcome.
1 6
EAJA contains two distinct attorneys' fees provisions applicable
in judicial proceedings: sections 2412(b) and (d) of Title 28 of the
United States Code. These sections, along with existing fee-shifting
statutes, generally provide three avenues to pursue recovery of fees
and other expenses in civil cases. First, if an action is litigated
under a statute explicitly permitting fee awards against the United
States, the prevailing party may seek fees under the specific provi-
sions of that statute. 7 Second, if an action is litigated under a stat-
ute which permits fee awards against private parties, but is silent as
against the United States, or if an action is litigated under a statute
which does not permit fee recovery but the prevailing party can
demonstrate a common law ground for such a recovery, the party
sibility Act of 1982, provides that any private party in tax cases can recover up to $25,000 in
attorneys' fees from the United States. 26 I.R.C. § 7430(b)(1) (1982).
16. The Supreme Court first enunciated the American Rule in Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3
U.S. (3 DalI.) 306 (1796). This rule is contrary to the "English Rule" under which attorneys'
fees are awarded to the prevailing party since they are viewed as an expense of litigation
which the losing party should bear. See Defner, The True "American Rule'" Drafting Fee
Legislation in the Public Interest, 2 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 251 (1979). For a lengthy list of
the statutory exceptions to the American Rule, see Cohen, Awards of Attorneys' Fees Against
the United States: The Sovereign Is Still Somewhat Immune, 2 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 177,
184-91 (1979).
In addition to statutory exceptions to the American Rule, courts have created a number
of judicial exceptions. Among these are the "common fund" exception, the "bad faith" ex-
ception and the "private attorney general" exception. The "common fund" exception pro-
vides that a party whose litigation results in a monetary fund both for himself and others may
require beneficiaries of that fund to contribute to compensation of the attorneys. See, e.g.,
Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881). The com-
mon fund theory was judicially expanded to include situations involving non-monetary bene-
fit, where a prevailing party's efforts resulted in a "common benefit" to a particular group.
See, e.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970). The "bad faith" exception
provides that an award of attorneys' fees is appropriate where the non-prevailing party has
disobeyed a court order and has "acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive
reasons." Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 530-31 (1962). Finally, the "private attorney
general" theory provides for the award of attorneys' fees in cases where a party undertakes an
action that the courts consider "vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest
priority." Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968). In Alyeska Pipe-
line Service Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975), however, the Supreme Court pro-
scribed the use of the private attorney general doctrine to permit recovery of attorneys' fees in
the absence of legislation, but confirmed the bad faith and common fund or common benefit
exceptions. Id. at 247-69.
For further discussion regarding exceptions to the American Rule, see Comment, Attor-
ney Fees: Slipping from the American Rule Strait Jacket, 40 MONT. L. REV. 308 (1979);
Note, Attorney Fees: Exceptions to the American Rule, 25 DRAKE L. REV. 717 (1976); Note,
Awarding Attorneys' Fees to the "Private Attorney General'" Judicial Green Light to Private
Litigation in the Public Interest, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 733 (1973).
17. See infra note 26 and accompanying text.
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may seek fees under section 2412(b). 8 Third, if an action is liti-
gated under a statute containing no fee-shifting provision and no
common law ground applies, the prevailing party may seek fees
under section 2412(d). 19
More specifically, section 2412(b) provides that courts may
award reasonable fees and expenses to a prevailing party in a civil
action against the United States20 where either the common law or
the express provision of a statute would permit an award of fees
against any other party.21 The principal common law grounds for
recovery of attorneys' fees are the "bad faith" and "common fund"
or "common benefit" theories."2 The "bad faith" theory allows an
award of fees where a party has willfully disobeyed a court order
and has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive
reasons. 3 Under the "common fund" or "common benefit" theory,
a court may award attorneys' fees to a party whose legal action re-
sults in the creation or preservation of a fund of money, or a benefit,
for others as well as for himself.24 In addition to the common law
theories, the United States may be liable for reasonable attorneys'
fees to a prevailing party under section 2412(b) whenever a statute
specifically authorizes such recoveries against non-Federal parties,
unless recovery against the United States is expressly prohibited in
the statute.
Distinct from section 2412(b), section 2412(d) provides that in
civil actions brought by or against the United States, except as
otherwise provided by statute,26 eligible prevailing parties shall be
18. See infra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
20. The civil action may be brought by or against the United States, an agency, or an
official of the United States acting in his or her official capacity. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (1982).
21. Id.
22. See supra note 16 for discussion of judicially created exceptions to the American
Rule.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. When an applicable statutory provision expressly prohibits awards of attorneys' fees
against the United States, there can be no recovery. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (1982).
26. The legislative history indicates that the "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute"
clause of § 2412(d)(l)(A) was intended to preserve the standards established by case law
under existing federal fee-shifting statutes and to insure the application of the Act "'only to
cases (other than tort cases) where fee awards against the government are not already author-
ized." H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 14, at 18, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4984, 4997.
The legislative history referred to several existing fee-shifting statutes, including the Free-
dom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1982); Titles II and VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2003a-3(2), 2000e-5(k) (1982); and the Voting Rights Act of 1975,
42 U.S.C. § 1973(l)(e) (1982). In addition to the legislative history, EAJA itself specifies that
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awarded attorneys' fees and other expenses unless the court finds
that the position of the United States was substantially justified or
that special circumstances27 make a fee award unjust.28  Certain
parties are precluded from recovery under section 2412(d). These
initially included individuals with net worths of more than $1 mil-
lion and sole proprietorships, partnerships, associations, corpora-
tions, and private organizations with either net worths exceeding $5
million or which had more than 500 employees.29 Section 2412(d)
nothing in § 2412(d) "alters, modifies, repeals, invalidates, or supersedes any other provision
of federal law which authorizes an award of such fees and other expenses." EAJA § 206, 94
Stat. at 2330.
27. Unlike § 2412(d), § 2412(b) does not mention substantial justification or special cir-
cumstances as limiting factors in awarding attorneys' fees, although it authorizes recoveries
against the United States only to the same extent a statutory provision would hold a private
party liable. Since some fee provisions applicable to non-Federal parties authorize courts to
decrease or deny attorneys' fees in special circumstances, it is possible that the special circum-
stances limitation may be considered by courts in making fee awards under § 2412(b) as well.
For example, the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 has been interpreted to
permit courts to deny recovery of attorneys' fees in special circumstances. See, eg., Chris-
tiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 434 U.S. 412, 421
(1978).
Not only can the underlying statute engraft the special circumstances limitation onto
§ 2412(b), it can also cause a § 2412(b) fee award to vary based upon whether the petitioning
party is a plaintiff or a defendant. With respect to the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards
Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982), a prevailing plaintiff ordinarily is entitled to attorneys'
fees unless special circumstances would render an award unjust. See Christiansburg Garment,
434 U.S. at 412. A prevailing defendant, however, is not routinely entitled to a fee award in a
civil rights case and should receive it only upon a finding that a plaintiff's action was "unrea-
sonable, frivolous, meritless or vexatious." Id. at 421 (quoting Carrion v. Yeshiva University,
535 F.2d 722, 727 (2d Cir. 1976)).
In other words, parties under § 2412(b) may receive disparate treatment because the ap-
plicable underlying fee provisions may discriminate between plaintiffs and defendants. This is
in contrast to § 2412(d), which applies a uniform standard in awarding attorneys' fees to
either eligible plaintiffs or defendants.
28. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).
29. But see 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B) (certain tax-exempt organizations and agricultural
cooperatives are not subject to a net worth limitation). Unlike § 2412(d), § 2412(b) contains
no financial eligibility or size requirements. See infra note 183 and accompanying text for the
1985 changes in the dollar limits.
The term "net worth" is not defined in the Act. The committee reports, however, state
that net worth "is calculated by subtracting total liabilities from total assets. In determining
the value of assets, the cost of acquisition rather than fair market value should be used." S.
REP. No. 253, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 17 (1979); H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 14, at 15,
reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4984, 4994. In United States v. Harper,
569 F. Supp. 602 (E.D. Pa. 1983), the successful defendant refused to reveal his assets and
liabilities for the record. The court found the defendant was not a "party" within the mean-
ing of the Act since there was no evidence on which the court could make a net worth
eligibility finding. Id. at 604.
With respect to size, neither the Act nor its legislative history offers any further assistance
in defining who constitutes an employee for purposes of the 500-employee limitation. Should
the question arise, the common law definition of "employee" would likely control. Generally,
19851
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limits recoverable attorneys' fees to $75.00 per hour, unless the
court determines that an increase in the cost of living or some spe-
cial factor justifies a higher fee. 30  Reasonable expert witness fees
and reasonable costs of necessary studies, analyses, reports, tests, or
projects are also recoverable under section 2412(d). 3' These are all,
however, subject to the proviso that a court may reduce or deny any
award under section 2412(d) if the prevailing party engaged in con-
duct which unduly protracted the resolution of the litigation.32
While sections 2412(b) and 2412(d) differ markedly,3 3 section
504 of Title 5 of the United States Code, addressing fee awards in
agency adjudications,3 4 is very similar to section 2412(d). Under
section 504, a federal agency or department that conducts an adver-
sary adjudication is required to award attorneys' fees and other ex-
penses to a prevailing party against the United States, unless the
adjudicative officer conducting the proceeding finds that the
agency's position was substantially justified or that special circum-
stances make an award unjust. 35 Section 504 also contains financial
eligibility requirements similar to those in section 2412(d), initially
limiting its application to individuals with a net worth of less than
$1 million and designated business entities with a net worth of less
than $5 million and fewer than 500 employees.36 Section 504 con-
employees include persons who regularly perform services for remuneration for a party,
under that party's direction and control. See Miller v. Municipal Theatre Ass'n, 540 S.W.2d
899, 904 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
30. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). In contrast, § 2412(b) speaks in terms of "reasonable
fees and expenses," but contains no specific limitations regarding total costs or hourly com-
pensation for attorneys.
31. But see 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (providing that no expert may be paid at a rate in
excess of the highest rate paid to an expert witness retained by the United States).
32. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(C).
33. See supra notes 17-32 and accompanying text. The manner in which fee awards are
paid also differs under § 2412(b) and (d), respectively. Any recoveries awarded under
§ 2412(b) are payable by the General Accounting Office from an appropriation fund com-
monly known as the general judgment fund. The only exception to this is when the court
bases a fee award upon the "bad faith" exception, whereupon the fee award must be paid
from the appropriation fund of the agency which acted in bad faith. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(c)(2).
Conversely, under § 2412(d), the prevailing party must first look to the losing party-agency
for payment of a fee or cost award. Only if the agency refuses to pay is the award payable
from the general judgment fund. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(4)(A).
34. Congress bifurcated the judicial and administrative processes by amending 28
U.S.C. § 2412 (preserving the former law of 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1976) in new § 2412(a)),
which dealt with judicial proceedings, and creating 5 U.S.C. § 504 which dealt with agency
actions. EAJA, 94 Stat. at 2325.
35. 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1). The analogous substantial justification and special circum-
stances limitations on fee awards in the judicial context are found at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412(d)(1)(A).
36. 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(B). See infra note 183 and accompanying text for the 1985
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tains cost and fee limitations analogous to those found in section
2412(d), providing for reasonable costs and expenses and a $75.00
ceiling on attorneys' hourly fees, absent a cost of living increase or
special circumstances justifying a higher fee.37 A party dissatisfied
with an attorneys' fee application filed pursuant to section 504 may
appeal to the Federal court with jurisdiction to review the merits of
the underlying agency adjudication. 8 Section 2412(d) controls any
judicial review of decisions made by agencies in adversary adjudica-
tions.39 In such cases, section 2412(d)(1)(B) directs the court to
award fees and other expenses to the same extent as the agency in-
volved would be required to award them under section 504(a).4
In drafting EAJA, Congress provided parties with three avenues
for seeking fee awards in civil cases, as well as an avenue for seeking
fee awards in administrative adjudications. Each of these avenues is
mutually exclusive and contains varying provisions regarding appli-
cation and content. Also varying are the judicial interpretations
which relate to certain of these provisions, to which this Article
now turns.
changes in the dollar limits. For a discussion of the definition of "net worth," see supra note
29. Financial eligibility requirements for parties in the judicial context similar to the ones in
§ 504 are found at 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B). As under § 2412(d), tax-exempt charitable
associations may recover fees under § 504 regardless of their net worth. There is, however, a
distinction between the two sections in their respective definitions of "party," although this
may be attributable to a drafting error. Section 504 fixes a net worth limitation in its "party"
definition at $1 million for individuals and $5 million for businesses, and uses an "and" in
limiting parties to no more than 500 employees. 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(B) (1982). Section
2412(d)(2)(B), on the other hand, fixes the same net worth limitations, but uses an "or" in
limiting parties to no more than 500 employees. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B) (1982). The re-
sult of this discrepancy is that under § 2412(d), the definition of "party" may be more
broadly construed than under § 504, permitting a business with 500 or fewer employees to
qualify as a "party" eligible for fees and expenses awards, even if its net worth totals more
than $5 million.
A second drafting discrepancy between the two sections is of no substantive consequence.
Section 2412(d)(2)(B) reads that a business entity "having not more than 500 employees" is
eligible for fees, while § 504(b)(1)(B) reads that a business entity "having more than 500
employees" is excluded.
37. 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(A). Similar cost, expense, and fee limitations are found in the
judicial context at 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). Both sections also have analogous method-of-
payment provisions. See 5 U.S.C. § 504(d)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(4)(A). As under
§ 2412(d)(1)(C), the amount of any award under § 504 may be reduced or eliminated if the
prevailing party engaged in conduct which unduly and unreasonably protracted the final res-
olution of the controversy. 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(3).
38. 5 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2). Ifa court grants a petition for leave to appeal a fee determina-
tion, it may modify the award or denial only if the failure to make the award or the calcula-
tion of the amount of the award constituted an abuse of discretion by the agency. The denial
of a petition for leave to appeal is not reviewable. Id.
39. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(3).
40. Id.
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B. Interpretive Ambiguities
During the three-year period that the original EAJA was in ef-
fect, the courts entertained numerous applications for fee and ex-
pense awards. As might be expected, various interpretations were
proferred with respect to several of the Act's provisions.
1. Prevailing Party.
In order to be eligible for a fee award under EAJA, the party
seeking the award must have prevailed against the United States4'
in a civil litigation4" or in an agency adversary adjudication.43 In
reviewing fee award requests, courts have had difficulty in deter-
mining what constitutes a "prevailing party." The Act's legislative
history makes clear that Congress intended the interpretation of
''prevailing party" to be consistent with the interpretation of that
term developed in case law under other fee-shifting statutes.' In
fact, the legislative history specifically recites certain case law on
this issue, stating that a prevailing party
should not be limited to a victor only after entry of a final judg-
ment following a full trial on the merits. A party may be deemed
prevailing if he obtains a favorable settlement of his case; if the
plaintiff has sought a voluntary dismissal of a groundless com-
plaint; or even if he does not ultimately prevail on all issues.4
41. To be eligible for a fee award, a party must prevail against the United States, any
agency of the United States, or any United States official acting in his official capacity. 28
U.S.C. § 2412(b) and (d)(2)(C). In Saxner v. Benson, 727 F.2d 669 (7th Cir. 1984), the court
disallowed a fee application because the defendant federal correctional officers, against whom
the plaintiff former inmates prevailed, were named individually and not as United States
officials acting in their official capacities. Id. at 673.
42. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) and (d)(1)(A). Habeas corpus petitions are not civil actions for
purposes of EAJA. See Boudin v. Thomas, 732 F.2d 1107, 1112 (2d Cir. 1984).
43. 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1). The "adversary adjudication" referred to in § 504(a) is defined
as an adjudication under 5 U.S.C. § 554 in which the United States' position is represented. 5
U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(C). Specifically excluded are rate fixing and licensing proceedings. Id.
Administrative proceedings under the Social Security Act are not adversary adjudications
within the meaning of EAJA. Therefore, fee awards for time expended in Social Security
cases at the administrative level are inappropriate. See Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978,
988, reh'g denied, 728 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1984); Guthrie v. Schweiker, 718 F.2d 104, 108 (4th
Cir. 1983); Cole v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 577 F. Supp. 657, 663 (D. Del.
1983); Phillips v. Heckler, 574 F. Supp. 870, 872 (W.D.N.C. 1983); Jones v. Schweiker, 565
F. Supp. 52, 54 (W.D. Mich. 1983). EAJA fee awards are also inappropriate for time spent in
labor certification review proceedings, since those proceedings are not deemed adjudications.
See Smedberg Machine & Tool, Inc. v. Donovan, 730 F.2d 1089, 1092 (7th Cir. 1984).
44. H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 14, at 11, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4984, 4989.
45. Id. It is undisputed that a party may be considered prevailing even if a case is
settled or voluntarily dismissed. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Watt, 554 F.
Supp. 36, 40 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd, 722 F.2d 1081 (2d Cir. 1983) (plaintiffs considered pre-
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Courts have generally acknowledged this approach, borrowing
from a well-accepted standard enunciated in another context by the
First Circuit in Nadeau v. Helgemoe.46 There, the Court stated that
"plaintiffs may be considered 'prevailing parties' for attorneys' fees
purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which
achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit."'4 7
Although courts generally followed the Nadeau precedent in evalu-
vailing parties in stipulated settlement since basic objectives of lawsuit were furthered
although specific relief requested was not achieved); Dubose v. Pierce, 579 F. Supp. 937, 946
(D. Conn. 1984) (plaintiffs considered prevailing parties by virtue of favorable settlement
terms obtained, since eligible claimants would receive greater payment than would be avail-
able through ultimately successful litigation); Ward v. Schweiker, 562 F. Supp. 1173, 1176
(W.D. Mo. 1983) (plaintiffs considered prevailing parties following stipulated dismissal since
they substantially achieved litigation objectives).
Courts must, however, closely scrutinize settlement agreements to ensure that the party
seeking fees was indeed in an adversarial position against the United States. For purposes of
EAJA, it is not enough that a party be nominally opposed to the United States in litigation.
Rather the party must hold a truly adversarial position. See, eg., Omaha Tribe v. Swanson,
736 F.2d 1218 (8th Cir. 1984) (plaintiff not considered prevailing party for purposes of EAJA
because not in an adversarial role against the United States with respect to claims settled in
plaintiff's favor); Walls v. Mississippi State Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 730 F.2d 306, 326 (5th Cir.
1984) (fees improperly assessed against United States under EAJA since plaintiffs neither
sought nor obtained relief against federal defendants); Citizens Coalition for Block Grant
Compliance, Inc. v. City of Euclid, 537 F. Supp. 422, 425 (N.D. Ohio 1982), afl'd, 717 F.2d
964 (6th Cir. 1983) (plaintiff not considered prevailing party for purposes of EAJA since it
had same goals as HUD and nothing in settlement agreement indicated plaintiff obtained
relief from HUD).
46. 581 F.2d 275 (1978). In fact, some courts follow a two-part standard known as the
Nadeau test, asking first whether the lawsuit was a necessary and important factor in achiev-
ing the relief desired. If the answer to that inquiry is negative, the party initiating the action
has not prevailed. Id. at 281. If, on the other hand, the answer is affirmative, the court must
then determine whether the relief obtained resulted from a gratuitous act on the part of the
opposition, or whether the opposition's actions were mandated by law. Gratuitous conces-
sions by one party do not elevate the other to the status of a prevailing party. Id. See, eg.,
Citizens Coalition for Block Grant Compliance, Inc. v. City of Euclid, 717 F.2d 964 (6th Cir.
1983) (plaintiffs failed on first prong of Nadeau test because of insufficient evidence of causal
connection between suit and HUD's actions). See generally Sullivan, Equal Access to Justice
Act, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1089, 1096-1101 (1984) (discussing the Nadeau standard and its
application under EAJA). Recently, the Supreme Court quoted Nadeau in identifying the
standard for determining prevailing party status. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433
(1983). Although the Hensley case concerned the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act
of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982), the Court stated that "[tihe standards set forth in this
opinion are generally applicable in all cases in which Congress has authorized an award of
fees to a 'prevailing party.'" 461 U.S. at 433 n.7. Consequently, courts examining prevailing
party status under EAJA since this 1983 decision have uniformly relied on the Nadeau stan-
dard as approved in Hensley. See, eg., Omaha Tribe v. Swanson, 736 F.2d 1218, 1221 (8th
Cir. 1984); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 716 F.2d 915, 919 (D.C. Cir. 1983);
McGill v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 712 F.2d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 1420 (1984); Citizens for Responsible Resource Dev. v. Watt, 579 F. Supp. 431,
446 (M.D. Ala. 1983); Knox v. Schweiker, 567 F. Supp. 959, 961 (D. Del. 1983).
47. 581 F.2d at 278-79.
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ating prevailing-party status, distinctions arose, and prevailing
party status was denied in several cases where it seemed that the
party did, indeed, succeed with respect to a significant issue which
achieved some of the benefit sought. The Eastern District of Mis-
souri, for example, denied prevailing party status to a plaintiff suing
the U.S. Army who claimed that he did not receive all the benefits
promised him upon enrollment in the Army Health Professions
Scholarship Program.48 The court found the plaintiff had not pre-
vailed in the lawsuit even though it appeared that the government
conceded to one of the plaintiff's three arguments prior to the trial
in the matter. 9
The Oregon District Court held that an illegal alien, who sued
the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service to restrain depor-
tation and extend his departure date, had not prevailed even though
he was allowed to leave the country voluntarily and was not de-
ported °.5  The court reasoned that while the plaintiff arguably may
have been better off as a result of the lawsuit, practically, he merely
preserved the status quo. To be entitled to attorneys' fees, a party
must prevail on the merits of at least some of his claims.5
Other courts have been more generous in determining prevailing
party status. The Third Circuit found plaintiffs had prevailed in
Spencer v. NLRB,52 since they were ultimately successful in ob-
taining the relief they sought, although they did not get a favorable
48. Allen v. Weinberger, 554 F. Supp. 108 (1982). The plaintiff claimed the Army failed
to provide a tax-free stipend, entry into a postgraduate program, and entry into active duty at
a rank of Major. Id. at 109.
49. Before trial, plaintiff's rank was upgraded from Captain to Major. Id. at 110. Plain-
tiff contended that, but for the lawsuit, he would not have received this benefit. Id. The court
found that plaintiff's change of rank was insufficient to raise him to prevailing party status,
since the action itself sought recission of plaintiff's contract and freedom from plaintiff's obli-
gation to the Army, and plaintiff did not prevail on those causes of action. Id. The court
further reasoned that plaintiff was not a prevailing party because he failed to prove that his
lawsuit was necessary in order to have his rank changed, since both administrative remedies
were available and adjustment of his rank to Major occurred before trial. Id.
50. Rico-Sorio v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 552 F. Supp. 965
(1982).
51. Id. at 968. The Rico-Sorio court firmly stated the necessity of prevailing on the
merits in an action in order to be a prevailing party. Id. at 968-69. In a footnote at the very
end of the opinion, however, the court hedged by noting that the plaintiff could be a prevail-
ing party despite losing on the merits if his lawsuit precipitated compliance with some of the
relief he sought. Id. at 969 n.5. The court nevertheless concluded the plaintiff's lawsuit did
not play a "catalytic role" in prompting the Immigration and Naturalization Service to act on
the merits of his request. Id.
52. 548 F. Supp. 256 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd, 712 F.2d 539 (1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
1908 (1984).
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decision on the merits. 3 Specifically, the plaintiffs in Spencer, a
group of qualified engineers, sought a court ruling that the National
Labor Relations Board violated the National Labor Relations Act
by denying their decertification petition and including them in a
mixed bargaining unit.54 Plaintiffs, however, essentially dismissed
their lawsuit prior to judicial action after the National Labor Rela-
tions Board found that they were professional employees entitled to
a separate election.15  The Spencer court followed "the trend in re-
cent decisions toward an expansive and liberalized approach to the
definition of a 'prevailing party,' "56 finding plaintiffs were prevail-
ing parties for purposes of EAJA "[e]ven if there were no causal
nexus whatsoever between the actions of the Board and the prosecu-
tion of this lawsuit by the plaintiffs."57 This position is contrary to
the general consensus that a party must show that the litigation ef-
fort was a causal factor in achieving his objectives or improving his
situation. 8
In addition to this general variation in the courts' application of
prevailing-party doctrine, two discrete issues have divided the
courts into diametrically-opposed camps. The first concerns
whether a plaintiff should be considered a prevailing party for pur-
poses of EAJA upon successfully obtaining a remand by the district
court after appealing a denial of Social Security benefits. The sec-
ond concerns whether a party could prevail against the United
States for purposes of EAJA in a condemnation proceeding.
As to the first question, the legislative history of the Act clearly
53. Id. at 259-62.
54. Id. at 257.
55. Id. at 257-58.
56. Id. at 259.
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., Martin v. Heckler, 733 F.2d 1499, 1501 (11th Cir. 1984) (plaintiff consid-
ered prevailing party even though lawsuit mooted by remedial action, since lawsuit brought
about the change in policy); United States v. Citizens State Bank, 668 F.2d 444, 447 (8th Cir.
1982) (defendant considered prevailing party in IRS summons enforcement since defendant
succeeded in limiting scope of summons even though court ordered compliance); Environ-
mental Defense Fund v. Watt, 554 F. Supp. 36, 40 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), aftd, 722 F.2d 1081 (2d
Cir. 1983) (plaintiffs considered prevailing party even though specific relief requested was not
received, since the basic objectives of the lawsuit were furthered); Ward v. Schweiker, 562 F.
Supp. 1173, 1176 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (plaintiffs considered prevailing party since they substan-
tially achieved objectives and case was catalyst for agreement favorable to plaintiff); William-
son v. Secretary of United States Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev., 553 F. Supp. 542, 544-45
(E.D.N.Y. 1982) (plaintiffs held not prevailing parties since there was no inference HUD
amended certain regulations as direct result of litigation. While the plaintiffs need not prove
that the lawsuit is the sole cause of the desired changes, plaintiffs must establish that the
litigation efforts were a necessary and important factor in improving the situation.).
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states that a fee award may be appropriate "where the party has
prevailed on an interim order which was central to the case, or
where an interlocutory appeal is 'sufficiently significant and discrete
to be treated as a separate unit.' " When a district court remands
a Social Security case to the Secretary of Health and Human Serv-
ices on procedural grounds following an initial denial of benefits,
some courts have reasoned that a fee award is inappropriate since a
decision on the merits is not involved, and benefits are not
awarded.6 ° Conversely, other courts have determined that fee
awards are appropriate in Social Security case remands for recon-
sideration or for taking additional evidence, since a remand is suffi-
ciently central to a case to justify a fee award.61
59. H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 14, at 11, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4984, 4989.
60. See, e.g., McGill v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 712 F.2d 28, 31 (2d Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1420 (1984) (plaintiff not considered prevailing party for pur-
poses of EAJA on remand in Social Security case since she had not yet prevailed on merits,
and the successful remand only moved her one step closer to final determination); Wade v.
Heckler, 587 F. Supp. 492, 493-94 (D. Del. 1984) (concluding prior decision in Knox v.
Schweiker, 567 F. Supp. 959 (D. Del. 1983), was wrongly decided, court held Social Security
disability claimant was not prevailing party for purposes of EAJA unless and until benefits
were awarded); Miller v. Schweiker, 560 F. Supp. 838, 840 (M.D. Ala. 1983) (remand for
reconsideration in Social Security case did not elevate plaintiff to prevailing party since he did
not receive any part of the benefits sought); Roman v. Schweiker, 559 F. Supp. 304, 305
(E.D.N.Y. 1983) (temporary success in having case remanded is insufficient to elevate plain-
tiff to prevailing party in Social Security case).
This same rationale has been employed by courts in considering other remand situations.
For instance, in Austin v. Department of Commerce, 742 F.2d 1417 (Fed. Cir. 1984), the
court ruled that a party who obtained a remand of an action to the Merit Systems Protection
Board was not entitled to an EAJA award, since a procedural defect was merely being reme-
died and no opinion on the merits was expressed. Id. at 1421.
61. See, e.g., Ceglia v. Schweiker, 566 F. Supp. 118, 122 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (plaintiff con-
sidered prevailing party within meaning of EAJA since remand for new hearing was central
to case); Gross v. Schweiker, 563 F. Supp. 260, 262 (N.D. Ind. 1983) (plaintiff was a prevail-
ing party since he obtained the requested relief of a remand, the only relief which the court
had authority to enter); Ocasio v. Schweiker, 540 F. Supp. 1320, 1321 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
(plaintiff considered prevailing party in stipulated remand for reconsideration).
When considering an EAJA application in a Social Security case, courts have often had to
consider whether 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1) of the Social Security Act, providing for a maximum
attorneys' fee of 25% of the total past due benefits, precluded a fee award under EAJA. The
ultimate consensus of the courts has been that the Social Security Act does not specifically
provide for an award of attorneys' fees to be paid by the United States to a party prevailing
against it, and that, therefore, the Social Security Act does not preclude application of the
EAJA fee-shifting provisions in Social Security cases. See, e.g., Wolverton v. Heckler, 726
F.2d 580, 582 (9th Cir. 1984); Guthrie v. Schweiker, 718 F.2d 104, 107-08 (4th Cir. 1983);
Watkins v. Harris, 566 F. Supp. 493, 496 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Vega v. Schweiker, 558 F. Supp.
52, 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Horal v. Schweiker, 551 F. Supp. 612, 615 (M.D. Tenn. 1982);
McDonald v. Schweiker, 551 F. Supp. 327, 332 (N.D. Ind. 1982); Shumate v. Harris, 544 F.
Supp. 779, 782 (W.D.N.C. 1982).
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With respect to the question concerning condemnation cases,
courts have also taken divergent positions. Some courts have found
that EAJA is inapplicable to condemnation proceedings, reasoning
that a landowner in a condemnation suit could not be classified as a
prevailing party against the United States.62 Other courts have rea-
soned that a landowner in a condemnation proceeding could qualify
as a prevailing party if forced to litigate to secure payment of just
compensation rather than accept an inadequate government offer.63
2. Substantial Justification.
Under both 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) and 5 U.S.C. § 504, a prevail-
ing party is entitled to attorney fees and expenses from the United
States unless the court or the adjudicative officer reviewing the fee
request "finds that the position of the United States was substan-
tially justified or that special circumstances make an award un-
just." 4 This provision applies to all agency adjudications and to all
civil actions except those sounding in tort, those already covered by
existing fee-shifting statutes, and those that are regulated exclu-
sively under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b).65
In reviewing fee award requests, courts have frequently ex-
amined the boundaries of "substantial justification.",66 The legisla-
62. See, ag., United States v. 160 Acres of Land, 555 F. Supp. 84, 86 (D. Utah 1982)
(section 2412(d) not applicable in condemnation proceeding); United States v. 341.45 Acres
of Land, 542 F. Supp. 482, 487 (D. Minn. 1982) (each party pays own costs in condemnation
proceedings and nothing in EAJA indicates that the policy of holding 28 U.S.C. § 2412 inap-
plicable has been reversed). The question of whether a party could ever prevail against the
United States in an eminent domain proceeding was rooted in the threshold question whether
or not EAJA was applicable in condemnation proceedings. Prior precedent established that
28 U.S.C. § 2412, as it existed prior to 1980, did not apply to condemnation cases. See
United States v. Bodcaw Co., 440 U.S. 202, 203 n.3 (1979). Furthermore, 42 U.S.C. § 4654
(1982) already provided for the award of landowner litigation expenses in condemnation pro-
ceedings in defined situations. In light of EAJA's language that the Act was not intended to
supersede any pre-existing fee-shifting statute, there was some question as to whether applica-
tion of the Act would merely supplement 42 U.S.C. § 4654 or impermissibly supersede it. See
160 Acres of Land, 555 F. Supp. at 86.
63. See, eg., United States v. 329.73 Acres of Land, 704 F.2d 800, 809 (5th Cir. 1983)
(en banc) (landowner may be a prevailing party when judgment results in a payment far
exceeding the government's original offer); United States v. 101.80 Acres of Land, 716 F.2d
714, 726 (9th Cir. 1983) (party may prevail against the United States when the government
tenders an inadequate deposit and the landowner must litigate).
64. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) and 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1), respectively.
65. Supra note 64.
66. The Act provides that a party seeking an award of fees is required to submit an
application within 30 days of final judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B) and 5 U.S.C.
§ 504(a)(2). No request for an EAJA fee award will be entertained absent an application
which complies with the statutory language. Rawlins v. United States, 686 F.2d 903, 914 (Ct.
Cl. 1982). Among the items which must be asserted in the application is that the position of
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tive history of the Act describes the standard for interpreting the
meaning of substantial justification as one of reasonableness.67
"Where the government can show 68 that its case had a reasonable
basis both in law and fact, no award will be made."69 The legisla-
tive history cites three examples of cases lacking substantial justifi-
cation as being a judgment on the pleadings, a directed verdict, and
a suit in which the same claim was dismissed in a prior suit.7" It
stresses, however, that the mere loss of a case by the government
does not give rise to a presumption that substantial justification is
lacking, and that the standard does not require the government to
demonstrate that its decision to litigate was based on a substantial
probability of prevailing.71
When confronting the issue of substantial justification, most
courts have adhered to the reasonableness standard and the guide-
lines enunciated in the legislative history.72 Some courts, however,
the United States or its agency was not substantially justified. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B) and
5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(2). Although the Act is silent in this respect, the legislative history indi-
cates that, if the government does not oppose the fee application, Congress intends that the
fee award should be granted. S. REP. No. 253, supra note 29, at 21; H.R. REP. No. 1418,
supra note 14, at 18, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4984, 4990. But see
FED. R. Civ. P. 55(e) ("No judgment by default shall be entered against the United States
...unless the plaintiff establishes his claim . . . by evidence satisfactory to the court.").
67. S. REP. No. 253, supra note 29, at 6; H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 14, at 10,
reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4984, 4988. According to the legislative
history of the Act, the "substantially justified" standard represents a compromise between the
dual standards for fee awards which exist under the Civil Rights Acts. Id. That is, prevailing
plaintiffs ordinarily recover their attorneys' fees, but prevailing defendants may recover fees
only upon a showing that plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation.
Id. The Senate rejected the former standard as inappropriate because it might have "a chil-
ling effect on reasonable Government enforcement efforts." S. REP. No. 253, supra note 29,
at 7. The latter standard was rejected as inadequate because "it simply would not overcome
the strong disincentives to the exercise of legal rights which now exist in litigation with the
Government." Id.
68. The burden rests with the United States to show its position was substantially justi-
fied. H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 14, at 10, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4984, 4989. See, e.g., Nichols v. Pierce, 740 F.2d 1249, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 1984); United
States v. First Nat'l Bank, 732 F.2d 1444, 1447 (9th Cir. 1984); Dougherty v. Lehman, 711
F.2d 555, 561 (3d Cir. 1983). The legislative history notes that with respect to those cases
where a party must engage in lengthy administrative proceedings before finally prevailing in
the courts, the United States should have to make a "strong showing" that its position was
reasonable. H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 14, at 18, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4984, 4997.
69. H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 14, at 11, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4984, 4989-90.
70. H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 14, at 11, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4984, 4990.
71. Id.
72. E.g., Citizens Council v. Brinegan, 741 F.2d 584, 593 (3d Cir. 1984); Cornella v.
Schweiker, 741 F.2d 170, 171 (8th Cir. 1984); White v. United States, 740 F.2d 836, 839
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have appeared to either extend or contract the reasonableness stan-
dard. For instance, a more stringent standard was adopted by one
court after noting that the Senate Judiciary Committee refused to
adopt an amendment changing the fee award language from "sub-
stantially justified to reasonably justified."73 Similarly, the Spen-
cer74 court stated that "an especially strong showing" of
substantially justified legal arguments should be necessary to avoid
EAJA liability when the government acts inconsistently and subse-
quently loses a civil action.7" The Seventh Circuit contracted the
reasonableness test by actually creating a modest presumption in
favor of awarding fees to the prevailing party unless the position of
the United States had a solid basis-i.e., more than not frivolous
but less than meritorious.7 6
On the other hand, a relaxation of the reasonableness standard
is apparent in the case of Trustees for Alaska v. Watt.7 7 The court
borrowed from the standard articulated in Rule 37 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, focusing its substantial justification deter-
mination on whether or not the government's position could be
characterized as "frivolous. ' 78  Demonstrating that a position is
(11th Cir. 1984); Houston Agricultural Credit Corp. v. United States, 736 F.2d 233, 235 (5th
Cir. 1984); United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 732 F.2d 1444, 1447 (9th Cir. 1984); Amidon v.
Lehman, 730 F.2d 949, 952 (4th Cir. 1984); Wyandotte Savings Bank v. NLRB, 682 F.2d
119, 120 (6th Cir. 1982).
73. Nunes-Correia v. Haig, 543 F. Supp. 812, 817 (D.D.C. 1982). See also Martin v.
Lauer, 740 F.2d 36, 43 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Phillips v. Heckler, 574 F. Supp. 870, 872
(W.D.N.C. 1983); See also Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 703 F.2d 700,
721 n.7 (3d Cir. 1983). This slightly more rigid standard was also used in Wolverton v.
Schweiker, 533 F. Supp. 420, 424 (D. Idaho 1982). The court of appeals partially reversed
and partially remanded the case. Wolverton v. Heckler, 726 F.2d 580, 584 (9th Cir. 1984).
The court, however, did not address whether the standard enunciated by the district court
was incorrect. It simply recited that "[t]o establish substantial justification, the Government
'must show its case had a reasonable basis both in law and in fact.'" Id. at 583 (quoting
Hoang Ha v. Schweiker, 707 F.2d 1104, 1106 (9th Cir. 1983)).
74. See supra note 52.
75. 712 F.2d at 561.
76. Bittner v. Sadoff& Rudoy Indus., 728 F.2d 820, 830 (1984). Another contraction of
the legislative history guidelines could arguably be found in Estate of Berg v. United States,
687 F.2d 377 (Ct. Cl. 1982), wherein the court did not address reasonableness as a standard,
but rather weighed whether or not the government's conduct was "reprehensible" in deter-
mining the appropriateness of an EAJA award. Id. at 383. The court, however, while noting
28 U.S.C. § 2412 when discussing a potential EAJA fee award, failed to distinguish whether
it was focusing on section (b) or section (d). Id. The court, therefore, may simply have been
considering a fee award under a section 2412(b) common law theory, rather than evaluating
whether the substantial justification requirement of section (d) was met.
77. 556 F. Supp. 171 (D. Alaska 1983).
78. Id at 173. The court noted that the language "substantially justified" was adopted
from FED. R. Civ. P. 37. Id. It further observed that the Act's legislative history, S. REP.
No. 253 at 20-21, refers to notes of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules concerning the
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merely not frivolous is easier than to demonstrate that it is, in fact,
reasonable.
Since the substantial justification standard is applied to ex-
tremely diverse factual situations, it is difficult to comment upon
any emerging pattern with respect to the standard's application.
There are, however, two groups of cases which lend themselves well
to such an analysis. In the first of these groups are those cases in
which the position of the United States is based upon a new or dis-
tinct interpretation of existing law. In this context, the question
becomes how new or distinct that legal interpretation may be and
yet still be considered substantially justified.79
When a vague or ambiguous law or regulation is at issue, the
courts generally have been willing to find the government's position
reasonable.8 0 For example, the Eighth Circuit denied an EAJA
award to a prevailing plaintiff where the government was forced to
interpret a group of facially conflicting regulations regarding proce-
Rule 37 standard, and that those Committee notes suggested that courts focus their evalua-
tion of substantial justification on whether the discovery dispute is genuine or frivolous. Id.
It is questionable, however, whether Congress intended to equate the substantial justification
standards of EAJA and FED. R. CIV. P. 37, since the Senate Report note to which the court
refers appears to relate only to the Advisory Committee notes regarding Rule 37 and its
adoption, not to EAJA. While the idea of a substantial justification requirement for EAJA
may have been derived from FED. R. Civ. P. 37, no meaningful analogy can be drawn with
respect to the boundaries of the EAJA standard. Cf Robertson & Fowler, Recovering Attor-
neys' Fees from the Government Under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 56 TUL. L. REV. 903,
930-32 (1982) (Although the substantial justification standard of EAJA has its roots in FED.
R. Civ. P. 37, the question is more complex under EAJA, rendering Rule 37 case law not
very helpful.). This position is bolstered by the fact that Congress rejected a standard of
liability whereby fees would be awarded only when government conduct was "arbitrary, friv-
olous, unreasonable or groundless." H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 14, at 14, reprinted in
1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4984, 4993; S. REP. No. 253, supra note 29, at 15.
79. The government's new or distinct interpretation of existing law may also be a special
circumstance which would make the award of EAJA fees unjust. See infra notes 97-99 and
accompanying text. In fact, in light of the legislative history to the Act, innovative interpre-
tations of existing laws appear to be more properly viewed as a question of special circum-
stance rather than a question of substantial justification. See H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note
14, at 11, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4984, 4990; S. REP. No. 253,
supra note 29, at 7.
80. See, e.g., Cinciarelli v. Reagan, 729 F.2d 801, 806 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Marine Corps
interpretation of phrase in written agreement substantially justified, since governing statute
lacked clarity and definitive construction). However, what one court may consider to be
vague or lacking in clarity may not be so considered by another court. For example, in
Southern Or. Citizens Against Toxic Sprays v. Clark, 720 F.2d 1475 (9th Cir. 1983), the
court found that an environmental "worst case analysis" regulation which was the focus of
the action was not difficult to interpret. Id. at 1481. Conversely, the district court had rea-
soned that the government's position was substantially justified since interpretation of the
regulation was in fact difficult. Id.
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dural matters in a Small Business Administration solicitation."'
The Fifth Circuit denied fees to a prevailing party, finding that the
government's new interpretation of an existing regulation which
cured possible due process defects was substantially justified, since
it had a reasonable basis in law.82 The Seventh Circuit denied an
EAJA award to a Cuban national who was granted a writ of habeas
corpus after having been held by the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service for over fifteen months without a hearing.83 The gov-
ernment argued that it could indefinitely detain aliens awaiting
exclusion hearings, since the applicable law did not limit the time in
which the Service must complete an investigation. 4 While the
court declined to express a definitive opinion on the correctness of
the government's position, it denied EAJA fees since it could not
label the United States' interpretation of the law as unreasonable.85
When the government attempts to argue a new interpretation of
law contrary to established precedent, however, the courts have
been less willing to find the position reasonable.86 For instance, the
Third Circuit ruled that the government's postponement of the ef-
fectiveness of amendments to certain regulations without a notice
and comment period was without substantial justification, since the
law is settled that notice and comment are necessary in rulemak-
ing.87 A Wisconsin district court ruled the government's position
81. Foley Construction Co. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 716 F.2d 1202, 1206
(1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1908 (1984). The plaintiff, an unsuccessful bidder in the solici-
tation, challenged the size of the contract's lowest bidder and was subsequently awarded the
contract. Id. at 1203.
82. S&H Riggers & Erectors v. Occupational Safety & Health Comm'n, 672 F.2d 426,
431 (1982). The court viewed the Commission's interpretation of the existing regulations as
"'a novel but credible extension or interpretation of the law' that has substantial justifica-
tion." Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 14, at 11, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4984, 4990). While courts have used the "novel but credible extensions
and interpretations of the law" rationale in evaluating whether the government position is
substantially justified, the Act's legislative history discusses this standard with respect to de-
termining whether "special circumstances would make an award unjust," rather than deter-
mining substantial justification. 672 F.2d at 431. See infra notes 97-111 and accompanying
text.
83. Ramos v. Haig, 716 F.2d 471, 472 (1983).
84. Id. at 474.
85. Id.
86. An extreme example is that of Southern Or. Citizens Against Toxic Sprays v. Clark,
720 F.2d 1475 (9th Cir. 1983). The court found that the United States' position lacked sub-
stantial justification, since the case on which the government relied to support its position in
the district court subsequently was reversed by another United States Court of Appeals. Id.
at 1481. Substantial justification was found lacking even though the only reported case inter-
preting the regulation supported the government's position. Id.
87. Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 703 F.2d 700, 712 (3d Cir. 1983).
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that Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) funds
could be used for parochial school personnel not substantially justi-
fied, since the United States Supreme Court had ruled that the use
of CETA funds for sectarian employment positions violated the es-
tablishment clause."8 In the case of Hoang Ha v. Schweiker,s9 a
California district court deemed the United States' position not sub-
stantially justified, since the Secretary of Health and Human Serv-
ices' contention regarding the publication of a regulation was
inconsistent with both his own agency's practice and clearly estab-
lished precedent.9" The Hoang Ha court noted that, not only did no
regulations or court decisions support the position of the United
States, virtually every issue in the case had been decided against the
Secretary before another district court.9" The Sixth Circuit, on the
other hand, appears to have assumed a less rigid stance. It found
substantial justification in the government's position, which was di-
rectly contrary to prior Sixth Circuit precedent, when the United
States attempted to reopen a "closed question" regarding bargain-
ing unit determination.92
The second group of cases reflecting interesting distinctions in
the substantial justification standard's implementation comprises
the Social Security disability actions. In a Social Security disability
case, the reviewing court must affirm the administrative findings of
the Secretary of Health and Human Services if the final agency de-
termination is based upon "substantial evidence."93 While the con-
88. Decker v. Department of Labor, 564 F. Supp. 1273, 1279 (E.D. Wis. 1983).
89. 541 F. Supp. 711 (N.D. Cal. 1982), rev'd, 707 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1983).
90. 541 F. Supp. at 713.
91. Id. The same defendant was charged by another district court with ignoring con-
trolling precedent regarding his burden of proof as to certain evidence when he took a posi-
tion "manifestly contrary" to the Ninth Circuit. Chee v. Schweiker, 563 F. Supp. 1362, 1365
(D. Ariz. 1983).
92. Wyandotte Savings Bank v. NLRB, 682 F.2d 119, 120 (6th Cir. 1982). One reason
for this holding appears to have been the fact that there was support for the government's
position in two other United States Courts of Appeals. Id. Compare the Sixth Circuit's ap-
proach to challenging established precedent with that taken in Citizens Bank v. United
States, 558 F. Supp. 1301 (N.D. Ala. 1983), where the court stated that "while it is entirely
conceivable that there is such a thing as a legitimate case for Uncle Sam's lawyers to use for
the purpose of challenging existing unliked precedent directly on point . . . EAJA was in-
tended to prevent the government from initiating or defending a 'sure loser.' " Id. at 1304.
93. 42 U.S.C. § 4059(g) (1982). The United States Supreme Court defined "substantial
evidence" in NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292 (1938).
Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, and must do more than create a suspi-
cion of the existence of the fact to be established. It means such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, and it must
be enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict when the
conclusion sought to be drawn from it is one of fact for the jury.
Id. at 300 (citations omitted).
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sensus among the courts is that one can find lack of substantial
evidence and still have substantial justification for purposes of a fee
award under EAJA,94 courts differ as to what quantum of evidence
is necessary for the government's position to be substantially justi-
fied. Some courts have held that if there is some evidence to sup-
port the final decision of the Secretary, then the government's
position is substantially justified.9" Other courts have interpreted
the substantial justification standard more stringently, weighing the
evidence considered and making an independent evaluation of its
sufficiency to determine if the government's position was substan-
tially justified.96
3. Special Circumstances.
In addition to denying EAJA fees when the United States' posi-
tion is substantially justified, the Act also provides that the govern-
ment should not be held liable for fees where "special circumstances
make an award unjust."97 The legislative history describes the
"special circumstances" provision of the Act as a "safety valve" to
help "insure that the government is not deterred from advancing in
good faith the novel but credible extensions and interpretations of
the law that often underlie vigorous enforcement efforts."9 8 The
special circumstances provision is also explained as one which
94. See, eg., Cole v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 577 F. Supp. 657, 661 (D.
Del. 1983); Hornal v. Schweiker, 551 F. Supp. 612, 617-18 (M.D. Tenn. 1982); Ulrich v.
Schweiker, 548 F. Supp. 63, 65 (D. Idaho 1982); Bennett v. Schweiker, 543 F. Supp. 897, 898
(D.D.C. 1982). But see Moholland v. Schweiker, 546 F. Supp. 383, 386 (D.N.H. 1982)
(court's ruling that Secretary's decision was not based upon substantial evidence automati-
cally establishes that the government's position was unjustified).
95. See, e.g., Wolverton v. Schweiker, 533 F. Supp. 420, 425 n.14 (D. Idaho 1982), rev'd
in part on other grounds sub nom. Wolverton v. Heckler, 726 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1984) (since
Secretary's decision rarely completely unsupported by evidence, few cases will arise where
Secretary's position is not substantially justified); Jones v. Schweiker, 565 F. Supp. 52, 56
(W.D. Mich. 1983) (some support found for ALJ's position so cannot conclude position of
Secretary not substantially justified).
96. See, eg., Lonning v. Schweiker, 568 F. Supp. 1079, 1083-85 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (gov-
ernment's position not substantially justified since psychologist on which it relied contra-
dicted other evidence of disability); Ceglia v. Schweiker, 566 F. Supp. 118, 124-25 (E.D.N.Y.
1983) (government's position not substantially justified since it relied on an expert physician
who did not examine the plaintiff); Kauffman v. Schweiker, 559 F. Supp. 372, 375-76 (M.D.
Pa. 1983) (government's position not substantially justified since medical evidence relied on
was from physician who examined plaintiff once and the other medical evidence was over-
whelmingly contradictory).
97. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(l)(A) and 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1). As with the matter of substan-
tial justification, this provision is inapplicable to cases arising under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b).
98. H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 14, at 11, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4984, 4990; S. REP. No. 253, supra note 29, at 7.
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would give courts "discretion to deny awards where equitable con-
siderations dictate an award should not be made."99
As with the substantial justification issue, it is difficult to discern
meaningful distinctions in court interpretations applying the special
circumstances standard, since each case is unique and turns on its
own particular facts. In fact, this difficulty is even more pro-
nounced in situations involving discretionary matters, where equita-
ble considerations are weighed, as under the special circumstances
provision. However, two groups of cases where courts have deter-
mined that special circumstances make an EAJA fee award unjust
merit discussion.
The first of these entails prevailing parties who come before the
court without clean hands. For example, the Second Circuit deter-
mined that the prevailing party on a writ of habeas corpus petition
was not entitled to EAJA fees since, but for his own repeated immi-
gration law violations, he would not have been improperly held by
the government at all."° Similarly, the Connecticut District Court
invoked its discretion based on equitable considerations and denied
an award of EAJA fees to a legal services lawyer who changed
agencies and attempted to be privately compensated for a case he
had taken with him.'' The court determined that those involved
never intended that the legal services lawyer handle the matter in
his personal capacity." °2 Furthermore, the court determined that
the lawyer's representations of his professional affiliations were
either confusing or misleading.0 3
The second group of cases entails new interpretations of existing
law. As noted in the preceding section,"° some courts view this
issue as one of substantial justification rather than one of special
circumstances. Whereas courts subscribing to the substantial justi-
fication perspective on this issue look to the reasonableness of the
government's position,' courts subscribing to the special circum-
stances perspective look to whether the government's position,
99. Id. Based on the language of the legislative history, it appears that Congress in-
tended the concept of "special circumstances" to be broader under EAJA than under the civil
rights statutes. While the latter are concerned with equitable considerations only as to the
factual context of the case, the former includes equitable considerations as to both the legal
position of the government and matters relating to the factual context of the case.
100. Oguachuba v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 706 F.2d 93, 98-99 (1983).
101. Dubose v. Pierce, 579 F. Supp. 937 (1984).
102. Id. at 962-64.
103. Id. at 964-65.
104. See supra notes 79-92 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text; Timms v. United States, 742 F.2d
489, 492 (9th Cir. 1984).
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while novel, is in fact credible. For instance, in Nunes-Correia v.
Haig,"' in response to a Constitutional challenge of the alien-
spouse regulations, the government contended that the regulations
were rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. The
Nunes-Correia court found special circumstances precluding a fee
award did not exist, since the government's argument, while un-
tested, was neither novel nor credible. 107 In Midwest Research In-
stitute v. United States, °8 however, the court found that the
government's position that certain income from a private not-for-
profit corporation was taxable as unrelated business income was
novel, making an EAJA award unjust.1 09
The language of the Act's legislative history seems to place the
consideration of a new interpretation of existing law squarely within
the purview of special circumstances rather than substantial justifi-
cation.110 A novel but credible extension or interpretation of the
law is specifically addressed as a special circumstance which would
make an EAJA award unjust.1" Any attempt at drawing a defini-
tive distinction in this matter, however, is conceivably academic, for
one could equate a "reasonable" interpretation for purposes of sub-
stantial justification with a "credible" interpretation for purposes of
special circumstances.
4. Position of the United States.
The United States is exempt from paying fees and other ex-
penses to a qualifying prevailing party under the Act if its "posi-
tion" in the matter is substantially justified. 12 An issue on which
court opinion is divided is what constitutes a "position" of the
United States within this context. Some courts have taken the view
that "position of the United States" is comprised only of its litiga-
tion position, i.e., its position as a party in prosecuting or defending
the matter under review. 13 A rationale for considering the litiga-
106. 543 F. Supp. at 812.
107. Id. at 820.
108. 554 F. Supp. 1379 (W.D. Mo. 1983), aff'd, 744 F.2d 635 (8th Cir. 1984).
109. 554 F. Supp. at 1392.
110. See H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 14, at 11, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4984, 4990; S. REP. No. 253, supra note 29, at 7.
111. See supra note 110.
112. See, eg., White v. United States, 740 F.2d 836, 842 (11th Cir. 1984); Amidon v.
Lehman, 730 F.2d 949, 952 (4th Cir. 1984).
113. See, eg., Cinciarelli v. Reagan, 729 F.2d 801, 806 (D.C. Cir. 1984); United States v.
2,116 Boxes of Boned Beef, 726 F.2d 1481, 1487 (10th Cir. 1984); Gava v. United States, 699
F.2d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Tyler Business Services, Inc. v. NLRB, 695 F.2d 73, 75
(4th Cir. 1982).
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tion position of the government as the requisite "position of the
United States" is that EAJA limits fee awards to those fees and
expenses "incurred" in civil actions.114 A reasonable inference can
be drawn, therefore, that "the position referred to is that taken by
the United States in the 'civil action' in which attorneys' fees were
'incurred.' "115 Another rationale for this "litigation position" pos-
ture is also found in the language of the Act. Since 5 U.S.C. § 504
focuses on the "position of the agency" as a party to the (adminis-
trative) proceeding,1 16 the same standard should be applied in civil
actions under 28 U.S.C. § 2412.117
Other courts, however, have taken the view that "position of the
United States" contemplates both its litigation position and its preli-
tigation conduct which was the basis for the underlying civil or
agency action.118 A rationale for considering both the government's
prelitigation and litigation conduct for purposes of defining "posi-
tion of the United States" is to further the Act's purpose of encour-
aging only government action having a reasonable basis in law and
fact. 1 9 If only the litigation position of the United States is ad-
dressed, the government has no accountability for agency conduct
as long as the United States' trial counsel acts reasonably.12 0 Some
courts, however, note that the distinction is of little functional dif-
ference, since the government's litigation position is usually an affir-
114. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The language regarding fees "incurred" in civil actions
also generated a question as to whether services rendered by pro bono counsel could be com-
pensated under EAJA. Since parties do not "incur" fee liability when pro bono counsel are
engaged, it has been argued that this constituted a special circumstance which would make a
fee award unjust, especially since the taxpayers are already funding most legal service organi-
zations. This argument has not garnered support, however, and the consensus is that legal
representation without charge does not preclude an EAJA award to an otherwise eligible
prevailing party. See, e.g., Cornella v. Schweiker, 741 F.2d 107, 172 n.2 (8th Cir. 1984);
Ceglia v. Schweiker, 566 F. Supp. 118, 122-23 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); Dubose v. Pierce, 579 F.
Supp. 937, 947 (D. Conn. 1984); Watkins v. Harris, 566 F. Supp. 493, 499 (E.D. Pa. 1983);
Jones v. Schweiker, 565 F. Supp. 52, 54-55 (W.D. Mich. 1983); San Filippo v. Secretary of
Health & Human Servs., 564 F. Supp. 173, 176 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); Kauffman v. Schweiker,
559 F. Supp. 372, 373-75 (M.D. Pa. 1983); Ward v. Schweiker, 562 F. Supp. 1173, 1175-76
(W.D. Mo. 1983); Hornal v. Schweiker, 551 F. Supp. 612, 616-17 (M.D. Tenn. 1982).
115. Broad Ave. Laundry & Tailoring v. United States, 693 F.2d 1387, 1390 (Fed. Cir.
1982).
116. 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (emphasis added).
117. See Tyler Business Servs. v. NLRB, 695 F.2d 73, 75 (4th Cir. 1982).
118. E.g., Citizens Council v. Brinegan, 741 F.2d 584, 592-93 (3d Cir. 1984); Iowa Ex-
press Distribution, Inc. v. NLRB, 739 F.2d 1305, 1309 (8th Cir. 1984); Rawlings v. Heckler,
725 F.2d 1192, 1195 (9th Cir. 1984).
119. See Iowa Express Distribution, Inc. v. NLRB, 739 F.2d 1305, 1309 (8th Cir. 1984).
120. Id.; Rawlings v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1192, 1196 (9th Cir. 1984).
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mation that its prelitigation conduct was legally justifiable.' 21
5. Final Judgment.
The Act provides that within thirty days of final judgment in an
action, an eligible prevailing party must apply'22 for fees and other
expenses in order to qualify for an EAJA award.'23 This thirty-day
time limitation is not a statute of limitations, but rather a jurisdic-
tional prerequisite to government liability. Failure to file a timely
fee application deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction to
award fees under the Act.124 Because of the significance of making
a fee request within thirty days of final judgment, the question of
exactly what constitutes a "final judgment" came before the courts
many times. Not surprisingly, however, the responses were not
uniform.
The Ninth Circuit determined that an EAJA application was
untimely if filed more than thirty days after a district court judg-
ment. 25 Stating that it was relying on "common usage" in making
this determination, the court rejected the contention that the provi-
sion only required filing within thirty days of the expiration of ap-
peal time or thirty days of the terminating action of the court of last
resort. 26 The Seventh Circuit took the contrary position, reasoning
that requiring a fee application within thirty days of district court
judgment would require a party to file multiple fee applications.'27
Alternatively, it would discourage fee award filings, since such ac-
121. See, eg., Foley Constr. Co. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 716 F.2d 1202,
1204 (8th Cir. 1983) (quoting Spencer v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 539, 551-52 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
122. In applying for a fee award under the Act, the applicant must show that it is a
prevailing party who is eligible to receive fees and other expenses under the Act. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412(d)(1)(B) and 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(2). The total amount sought must be included, along
with a statement itemizing the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and expenses
were computed. Id. The party must also allege that the United States' position was not
substantially justified. Id. The right created under the Act lies in the prevailing party, not
the prevailing party's lawyer. Thus, the fee applicant must be the party himself for the court
to have jurisdiction. See Prettyman v. Heckler, 577 F. Supp. 997, 999 (D. Mont. 1984).
123. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B) and 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(2); H.R. REP. No. 1434, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5003, 5015.
124. See Action on Smoking and Health v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 724 F.2d 211, 225
(D.C. Cir. 1984).
125. See McQuiston v. Marsh, 707 F.2d 1082, 1085 (1983).
126. Id. The District of Columbia District Court followed the Ninth Circuit by finding
untimely an EAJA application filed eighty-six days after the district court's judgment entry.
Massachusetts Union of Pub. Hous. Tenants v. Pierce, 577 F. Supp. 1499, 1502 (1984). The
court noted, however, that the thirty-day time limitation did not apply to applications filed
under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b). Id. at 1501.
127. McDonald v. Schweiker, 726 F.2d 311, 314-15 (7th Cir. 1983).
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tion within the appeal period might prompt a government appeal. 2
The court concluded that "within thirty days of final judgment"
was more appropriately "within thirty days after the judgment in
the district court has become final and unappealable, or after the
court of appeals or the Supreme Court has entered a final
judgment." '129
A related timing question deals with the pendency of cases.
Since an action had to be "pending" on October 1, 1981, in order
for an otherwise eligible party to come within the purview of the
Act, 130 courts also considered the issue of final judgment in this
context. In Berman v. Schweiker,13 1 the court determined that the
case was pending on October 1, 1981, for the purposes of EAJA,
since the losing party's right to appeal had not yet expired as of that
date, although judgment had been recorded. 132 While courts gener-
ally followed Berman when the time to appeal an action had not yet
run,13 3 courts disagreed on whether an action was "pending" when
the only matter under consideration on October 1, 1981, involved
the awarding of attorneys' fees. 134 Similarly, some courts also dif-
fered on the question of whether fees in a pending case were to be
128. Id.
129. Id. at 315. Accord United States v. 329.73 Acres of Land, 704 F.2d 800, 810-11 (5th
Cir. 1983); Knights of the Ku Klux Klan Realm v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 679
F.2d 64, 66-68 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied 691 F.2d 502 (1982); American Academy of Pediatrics
v. Heckler, 580 F. Supp. 436 (D.D.C. 1984). In American Academy of Pediatrics, the court
determined that "final judgment in the action" referred to the final resolution of the case, that
being the dismissal of the appeal by the Secretary rather than the decision of the district
court. Id. at 437. The court reasoned that to award fees prior to the appeal might result in
the eventually successful party's "having subsidized a large segment of the losing party's suit
against him." Id. This rationale, however, is rather tenuous, since the General Accounting
Office will not approve payment of a claim under EAJA until all appellate proceedings are
completed. See McDonald v. Schweiker, 726 F.2d 311, 315 (7th Cir. 1983).
130. EAJA § 203(c), 94 Stat. 2325, 2327 (1980).
131. 531 F. Supp. 1149 (N.D. Il1. 1982), aff'd, 713 F.2d 1290 (7th Cir. 1983).
132. 531 F. Supp. at 115 1. The court also sua sponte considered the final judgment issue
with respect to whether the prevailing party had applied for EAJA fees within the requisite
thirty-day period. Id. The court determined that the fee application was timely, since the
controlling date for purposes of an EAJA "final judgment" is the date a judgment is re-
corded, not the date a judgment is issued. Id. at 1151-52.
133. See, e.g., United States for Heydt v. Citizens State Bank, 668 F.2d 444, 446 (8th Cir.
1982); Photo Data, Inc. v. Sawyer, 553 F. Supp. 348, 350-51 (D.D.C. 1982).
134. Compare Commissioners of Highways v. United States, 684 F.2d 443, 444 (7th Cir.
1982) and Nichols v. Pierce, 740 F.2d 1249, 1255-58 (D.D.C. 1984) (cases not pending for
purposes of EAJA when only unresolved issue as of October 1, 1981, is an appeal from a
denial of an attorney's fee award) with Knights of the Ku Klux Klan Realm v. East Baton
Rouge Parish School Bd., 679 F.2d 64, 68 (5th Cir. 1982) (action considered pending even
though only outstanding matter on October 1, 1981, was an appeal from a denial of attorneys'
fees).
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allowed retroactively for work performed prior to the inception of
the Act.135 These interpretive difficulties, as well as the approach-
ing termination of the Act under its sunset provision, prompted
Congress to draft the 1984 EAJA amendments.
II. THE 1984 PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
In October of 1984, the United States Congress voted to repeal
the sunset provision of EAJA and to extend a modified version of
the Act on a permanent basis. 36 Although President Reagan ulti-
mately vetoed the proposed amendments to the Act, 137 he expressed
a commitment both to the underlying policies of the Act and its
reauthorization, contingent upon satisfactory revision of the amend-
ments. 138 The proposed 1984 amendments, while not enacted into
law, resolved a few of the ambiguities in EAJA as implemented in
1981. More important, they indicated that Congress was prepared
to broaden, rather than narrow, government liability for the pay-
ment of attorneys' fees.
One of the interpretive ambiguities clarified in the 1984 amend-
ments was whether "position of the United States,"' 139 which must
be substantially justified to avoid fee liability, referred only to its
litigation posture or included also its prelitigation conduct. The
amendments made clear that the "position" of the United States
referred to in the matter of substantial justification was the latter. "
135. Most courts held that work performed prior to October 1, 1981, was entitled to
compensation under EAJA. See, eg., Berman v. Schweiker, 713 F.2d 1290, 1303 (7th Cir.
1983); National Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 703 F.2d 700, 712-13 (3d Cir. 1983);
Kay Mfg. Co. v. United States, 699 F.2d 1376, 1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Tyler Business
Servs. v. NLRB, 695 F.2d 73, 77 (4th Cir. 1983). Contra Allen v. United States, 547 F. Supp.
357, 361 (N.D. Ill. 1982). Cf. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Rosenthal & Co.,
545 F. Supp. 1017, 1019 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (EAJA may apply only to fees incurred after Octo-
ber 1, 1981, but judgment reserved on matter).
136. See 130 CONG. Rc. H12171-74 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984). Following a September 6,
1984 report from the Committee on the Judiciary regarding amendment of EAJA, H.R. REP.
No. 992, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984), Congress reviewed and revised the proposed modifica-
tions several times before arriving at an acceptable version. See supra note 6.
137. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
138. Specifically, the President objected to the proposed definition of "position of the
United States" and to the proposed interest provision. Id. See also infra notes 167-73 and
accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 112-21 and accompanying text for a discussion of the divergent
views regarding what constitutes the "position of the United States."
140. Congress effected this clarification by striking the language "as a party to the pro-
ceeding" found at 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) and substituting new definitions relating to position in
5 U.S.C. § 504(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2). The new definition recommended for
§ 504(b)(4)(E) stated that "'position of the agency' includes the underlying action which led
to the adversary adjudication," while the new definition recommended for § 2412(d)(2)(B)
1985]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Much broader than the government's mere litigation position, it in-
cluded government or governmental agency actions and omissions
which led to the adversary adjudication or civil action.' Congress
made this evident by including the "underlying" action which led to
the adversary adjudication or civil litigation within the definition of
the government's "position." '42
A second ambiguity clarified by the amendments was the issue
of what constitutes a "final judgment" for purposes of an EAJA
application. 1 3 Courts were divided on the question of what point
in time triggered the commencement of the thirty-day period after
"final judgment" in which a fee application must be filed."4 In the
1984 amendments, Congress specifically stated that no application
for a fee award may be made until a final and unreviewable, or not
appealable, decision is rendered in a matter.'45 Thus, a district
court judgment would not cause the thirty-day period to begin to
run.
The third area Congress addressed was prevailing party status.
One aspect of this issue upon which the courts disagreed was
whether there could be a prevailing party for purposes of EAJA
within the context of condemnation proceedings.'46 The proposed
amendments tb the Act not only made clear that condemnation ac-
tions are subject to EAJA, they also provided a standard for deter-
stated that " 'position of the United States' includes the underlying agency action which led
to the litigation." 130 CONG. REc. H12172 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984). In both new defini-
tional sections, the amendments provided an exception to the award of fees and expenses
when the prevailing party has "unreasonably protracted the proceedings." Id. at H12172-73.
141. See H.R. REP. No. 992, supra note 6, at 3.
142. See 130 CONG. REC. H12172 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984) (proposed amendments to 5
U.S.C. § 504(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)).
143. See supra notes 122-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of the divergent
views regarding what constitutes a "final judgment."
144. Id.
145. Congress effected this clarification by proposing the addition of § 2412(d)(2)(G) to
Title 28. It states that "'final judgment' means a judgment that is final and not applicable
[sic]." See 130 CONG. REc. H12173 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984). Congress also proposed to
clarify in the amendments that fee award decisions of adjudication officers are final. The
following additional language was to be added to 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1): "The decision of the
adjudicative officer on the application for fees and other expenses shall be the final adminis-
trative decision under this section." 130 CONG. REC. H12172 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984).
Moreover, language was also to be added to 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(2) to clarify that no fee award
could be made in connection with an agency adjudication until a final and unreviewable deci-
sion by the appeals court is rendered, or appeal rights have expired. Id. Lastly, § 504 (c)(2)
was designed to expand the ability of either party to appeal agency fee award decisions, while
reducing the standard of judicial review from abuse of discretion to that of substantial evi-
dence. Id.
146. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text for a discussion of the divergent views
regarding condemnation proceedings.
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mining who the prevailing party would be in such actions. 147
While Congress specifically addressed the prevailing party issue
in condemnation cases, it declined to take a stand on the prevailing
party issue in Social Security remand cases. The courts were di-
vided on whether there could be a prevailing party for purposes of
EAJA in instances when a Social Security case was remanded by
the court on procedural grounds for further proceedings.148 While
the House of Representatives proposed language explicitly includ-
ing in the definition of a prevailing party one who has won an order
of remand in a Social Security case, 4 9 the Senate and the House of
Representatives were unable to agree on its scope. 5 0 Thus, the pro-
posed amendments to the Act, as approved by Congress, were silent
with respect to prevailing party status in Social Security remand
cases.
The 1984 amendments to the Act did, however, address the
award of attorneys' fees in Social Security cases in general by af-
firming the consensus of the judiciary' that EAJA is applicable to
a party who substantively prevails in a Social Security case. 152 The
proposed amendments specifically stated that the attorneys' fees
provision in the Social Security Act, which awards attorneys' fees
147. The amendments proposed that language be added at 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(H)
which would specifically delineate certain parties in eminent domain proceedings as prevail-
ing parties. Essentially, the "prevailing party" in a condemnation action involving the United
States would be the party whose testimony in court was closest to the prevailing valuation.
See 130 CONG. REc. H12173 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984).
148. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text for a discussion of the divergent views
regarding Social Security remand cases.
149. See H.R. REP. No. 992, supra note 6, at 3. On September 11, 1984, when H.R. 5479
originally passed in the House of Representatives, the amendments contained the following
language: "'prevailing party in a civil action' includes a party who, pursuant to § 205(g) or
§ 1631(c)(3) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 405(g) or § 1383(c)(3)), has won an order
remanding the cause for further hearing." 130 CoNG. REc. H9298 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1984).
150. The Senate modified the language proposed by the House of Representatives to con-
tain three exceptions where the provision would not apply, those being:
(i) to cases to the extent that the remand was based on section 2(d) of the Social
Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984;
(ii) to cases to the extent the remand is requested by the claimant in order to intro-
duce new evidence which the claimant had not introduced or attempted to intro-
duce at the administrative agency level; or
(iii) to cases in which, after the remand, the claimant has not prevailed with respect
to the underlying issue.
130 CONG. REc. HI 1480 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1984). Since only the first of the three exceptions
was acceptable to the House, see id., and the Senate rejected the compromise language, see
130 CONG. REc. H12171 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984), the House returned the bill deleting all
language referring to remands in Social Security actions. See 130 CONG. REC. H12173 (daily
ed. Oct. 11, 1984).
151. See supra discussion in note 61.
152. See 130 CONG. REC. H12173 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984).
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from the past due benefits of successful litigants, 5 3 would not pre-
clude an award to prevailing parties under EAJA.'54 The amend-
ments did assert, however, that attorneys' fees collected under the
Social Security Act must be given directly to the prevailing party
rather than counsel, insofar as the fees relate to the same work for
which an EAJA award is made.' 55 The rationale for this provision
lies in the fact that attorneys' fees awarded under the Social Secur-
ity Act come from, and therefore reduce, the accrued past due ben-
efits of the petitioner. In effect, when an EAJA award is made, the
past due benefits of the prevailing party would not be reduced by an
attorneys' fee award, provided the EAJA award was related to the
same work for which the Social Security Act fees would be
collected.
In addition to clarifying past ambiguities, Congress redefined
the scope of an eligible "party" under the Act. The amendments
expanded the net worth limitation from $1 million to $2 million for
an individual and from $5 million to $7 million for a business or
organization.' 56 Congress also included a "unit of local govern-
ment" within its party definition, rendering small cities, counties,
villages and the like eligible for EAJA awards if they otherwise
qualify. 157
Congress also broke new ground by including a provision in the
amendments to serve as an incentive to the United States to meet its
obligation to promptly pay fee awards. Specifically, Congress pro-
vided that if a fee award is not paid by the United States within a
sixty-day period, the government would be liable for the payment of
interest on the amount of the award from that time forward.' 58
Finally, Congress addressed several procedural details. It af-
firmed the general judicial consensus that fee awards could be col-
lected for legal work performed prior to October 1, 1981, provided
the underlying action was pending on that date.' 59 Congress also
153. The Social Security Act allows a court to authorize up to 25% of the total of past-
due benefits as attorneys' fees. 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1) (1982). It also provides for a misde-
meanor fine for persons seeking an amount in excess of the requisite 25% fee award. Id.
§ 406(b)(2).
154. See 130 CONG. REC. H12173 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984).
155. Id. It follows that an attorney collecting attorneys' fees under EAJA must use such
fees to reduce the total fee liability of his client based upon the portion of past-due benefits
which might be outstanding. See supra note 153.
156. See 130 CONG. REC. H12172 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984). See supra notes 29 and 36
and accompanying text for a discussion of the Act's original net worth requirements.
157. See 130 CONG. REc. H12172 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984).
158. See 130 CONG. REC. H12172-73 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984).
159. See supra note 135. The proposed amendments were to contain a provision that
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confirmed that both the United States Claims Court16° and agency
boards of contract appeals161 have jurisdiction to make fee awards
under the Act. As a final caveat, Congress advocated reconsidera-
tion of some dismissed fee petitions. Congress provided that certain
amendment provisions would be applicable to timely filed cases
pending on or commenced after October 1, 1981, which had been
previously dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.162
Although the proposed amendments to EAJA were not enacted
into law because of a Presidential veto, they serve to help interpret
ambiguous provisions of the original Act on which court decisions
have been divided. Since any matter which was pending on October
1, 1984, may be eligible for an EAJA fee award under the original
Act, courts will continue to be faced with these issues for some
time. Furthermore, the 1984 proposed amendments served as a ba-
sis for the recently enacted 1985 legislation.
III. PRESIDENTIAL VETO OF THE 1984 PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS
On November 8, 1984, President Reagan vetoed the 1984 pro-
posed amendments to EAJA.163 Although committed to the under-
"[a]wards may be made for fees incurred before October 1, 1981, in any such adversary
adjudication or civil action." 130 CONG. REc. H12173 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984).
160. In a new definitional section, the proposed amendments were to include the United
States Claims Court within the definition of "court" at 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(F). See 130
CONG. REc. H12173 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984). Since the Act was enacted prior to the Federal
Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982), Congress at-
tempted to clarify that the United States Claims Court, which assumed the trial court func-
tion of the Court of Claims, had jurisdiction to make fee and expense awards under EAJA.
161. New language was to be contained in the proposed amendments at 5 U.S.C.
§ 504(b)(1)(C), expressly bringing proceedings before agency boards of contract appeals
within the Act. See 130 CONG. REc. H12172 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984). In addition, the
definition of "civil action brought by or against the United States" was to include the follow-
ing at 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(E): "an appeal by a party, other than the United States, from a
decision of a contracting officer rendered pursuant to a disputes clause in a contract with the
Government or pursuant to the Contract Disputes Act of 1978." 130 CONG. REc. H12173
(daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984). These proposed changes were to enable prevailing contractors to
receive fees and expenses before agency boards or the United States Claims Court, since a
contractor may bring a contract dispute before either entity. See generally Contract Disputes
Act of 1978, 41 U.S.C. §§ 601-13 (1982).
162. See 130 CONG. REc. H12173 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984). The proposed amendments
to the Act also included several technical alterations to improve the Act. In 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412(a) and (b), the phrase "or any agency and any official of the United States" was to be
substituted with "or any agency or any official of the United States." 130 CONG. REC.
H12172 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984) (emphasis added). Added to the definition of a "civil ac-
tion" under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) were the words "including proceedings for judicial
review of agency action." Id.
163. See 20 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc., supra note 7, at 1814.
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lying policies of the Act, he felt certain changes embodied in the
proposed amendments to EAJA did not further the purposes of the
Act and were inconsistent with fundamental principles of good gov-
ernment. 64 The President stated that he would make "the perma-
nent and retroactive reauthorization of the Act a high legislative
priority."' 165 He also made it clear, however, that he was referring
to an "acceptable reauthorization," having noted several specific ob-
jections to the proposed amendments. 166
Specifically, although not exclusively, the President noted two
proposed changes to EAJA which he found objectionable. The
President's strongest objection concerned the proposal to alter the
definition of "position of the United States" for purposes of substan-
tial justification. 67 As previously discussed, EAJA provides that an
otherwise prevailing party may recover attorneys' fees and other ex-
penses unless the position of the United States was substantially jus-
tified or unless special circumstances would make a fee award
unjust. 168 The proposed amendments would have resolved the judi-
cial dispute concerning whether "position" refers merely to the gov-
ernment's litigation position, or also includes the underlying
governmental action which led to the dispute, in favor of the lat-
ter. 169 The President believed this to be an unwarranted extension
of the "position of the United States" definition, which would result
in wasteful litigation over a subsidiary issue and "undermine the
free exchange of ideas and positions within each agency that is es-
sential for good government."' 170
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1815.
167. Id. at 1814.
168. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text.
170. See 20 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc., supra note 7, at 1814-15. The interpretation of
"position of the United States" supported by the President would enable the government to
avoid fee and expense liability under EAJA for improper governmental conduct merely by
ensuring that the Department of Justice or agency lawyers assume a reasonable position once
a civil action or adversary adjudication is commenced. How one interprets "position" will
significantly influence the number of fee awards made under the Act and, consequently, the
amount of tax dollars expended. While there is no doubt that the Administration is con-
cerned about government spending, it is interesting to note that awards made under the Act
during its three years of operation did not even approach the 1980 projected costs. At the
inception of the Act, the Congressional Budget Office projected that the legislation would
cost $92 million in 1982, $109 million in 1983, and $129 million in 1984. See H.R. REP. No.
1418, supra note 14, at 21 and 24, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, 4984,
5000. In annual reports filed by the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, the following fee and expense awards were reported by federal courts:
$683,518 in 13 cases from October 1, 1981 - June 20, 1982; $1,717,094 in 52 cases
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The President also objected to the new interest payment provi-
sion of the proposed legislation."' 1 According to the President, im-
posing interest payments if an award is not paid within sixty days
unfairly favors lawyers receiving EAJA awards over other individu-
als awaiting payment from the government.172  The President
opined that such favoritism is inappropriate and that interest should
be paid to recipients of EAJA awards in the same manner as it is
paid to any other group entitled to government interest payments
on court judgments. 173
Notwithstanding his objections to the 1984 legislation, President
Reagan voiced a firm commitment to the Act's underlying policies
and its eventual reauthorization. He so informed the heads of his
executive departments and agencies, instructing them to review
agency procedures to ensure substantial justification and to con-
tinue to accept and retain applications for fee awards, pending the
reauthorization of EAJA in 1985.174 This reauthorization has fi-
nally occurred.
IV. THE 1985 REBIRTH OF EAJA
Among the matters Congress addressed in drafting new fee leg-
islation were the two 1984 amendments which the President specifi-
cally found objectionable-the interest payment provision and the
from July 1, 1982 - June 30, 1983; and $1,270,682 in 157 cases from July 1, 1983 -
June 30, 1984.
1983 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS 80-85; 1984 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES 91-97. The Administrative Conference of the
United States filed similar reports. Agency proceedings resulted in no awards of fees and
expenses during the period from October 1, 1981, through September 30, 1982. 1982 RE-
PORT OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
ON AGENCY ACTIVITIES UNDER THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT 2. During the period
from October 1, 1982, through September 20, 1983, awards totalled $35,933.89 in eight pro-
ceedings. 1983 REPORT OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES ON AGENCY ACTIVITIES UNDER THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT
3. While it is evident that these figures fall far short of the projected estimates, the differential
may be even greater than appears at first blush, for the above-noted figures reflect only initial
awards and do not include the disposition of cases following appeal.
In projecting the costs of the 1984 proposed amendments, the Congressional Budget Of-
fice, while warning that costs could vary significantly, estimated that the number of fee
awards would likely increase by 50 each year, since the number of awards grew from 20 in
1982 to 130 in 1984. See H.R. REP. No. 992, supra note 6, at 17-18. Estimating an average
award at $6,000, with a few unusually large awards each year, projected annual costs of
$5,000,000 were anticipated by 1989. Id. at 18.
171. See 20 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC., supra note 7, at 1815.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1815-16.
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clarification of the "position of the United States" as it relates to the
substantial justification issue. With respect to the former, Congress
did not insist on retaining the late-payment interest provision, since
there appears to be no compelling reason justifying more favorable
treatment for EAJA award recipients than for other groups entitled
to fee payments from the government. It did, however, provide for
interim interest if the United States appeals a fee award and the
award is later affirmed. 175
Congress was also able to resolve the question of what "posi-
tion" of the United States must be substantially justified in order to
avoid fee liability by interpreting "position" broadly while limiting
the court's scope of review on the issue. In vetoing the proposed
1984 amendments to the Act, the President subscribed to the view
that "position of the United States" focused on the "litigation posi-
tion" assumed by the government in civil actions and agency adju-
dications. 176  That is, if the government's legal posture as an
adversary in the civil or agency action is substantially justified, no
fee liability attaches. Congress, on the other hand, was committed
to the position that the definition of "position" includes the govern-
mental activity which led to the dispute. 177 As between these two
perspectives, the Administration's view was much more restrictive
than Congress'. In fact, under the Administration's view the
United States could escape liability by simply assuming a reasonable
position during the litigation or adversary adjudication, no matter
how improper its conduct was during initial contact with the ulti-
mately prevailing party.
The issue of liability, however, did not appear to be the Presi-
dent's chief concern when he opposed the interpretation of "posi-
tion of the United States" in 1984. Rather, his concern was that the
provision "would lead to extensive discovery on how the Govern-
ment's action was formulated" when addressing the fee award ques-
175. See 131 CONG. REc. S9996 (daily ed. July 24, 1985). An indepth analysis of the
1985 amendments to EAJA is beyond the scope of this article. Rather, the focus remains on
the legislative evolution of the Act from its inception.
176. See supra notes 167-70 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text. At first glance, the Administration's
position taken in 1984 seemed harsh and contrary to the affirmatively stated purposes under-
lying EAJA. Upon fuller consideration, however, it becomes clear that this approach pro-
tects the United States taxpayers from fee liability based upon conduct of low-level
bureaucrats who act unadvisedly. While the Congressional interpretation of "position" ap-
peared to better serve as a check on unreasonable government conduct, it may be criticized
for imposing fee liability on the United States for unauthorized conduct of petty government
employees.
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tion.178  The new legislation, while adhering to a broader
interpretation of "position," that being, the government position
taken in the action as well as the government action or failure to act
upon which the lawsuit is based, 179 responds to the President's ob-
jections. Specifically, courts considering fee applications are di-
rected to consider only the record developed on the merits of the
case when evaluating whether the government's prelitigation posi-
tion was substantially justified. 80 "No 'fishing expeditions' will be
allowed, so as to turn the fees case into a second major
litigation." 8 '
The effect of the new definition of "position" of the United
States, of course, remains to be seen. While not specifically ad-
dressed as an administrative concern, it is possible that a broaden-
ing of the definition of "position" could lead to extensive liability on
the part of the government. Specifically, taxpayers could be held
responsible for fee liability based upon conduct of low-level bureau-
crats who act unadvisedly. If runaway liability becomes problem-
atic, Congress should reevaluate the Act and consider the
incorporation of a requirement analogous to an "exhaustion of rem-
edies" provision. Under an exhaustion provision, the aggrieved in-
dividual or small business would shoulder the burden to take
affirmative steps to notify the appropriate agency head or other re-
sponsible government official of its complaint. The governmental
entity would thereby be given an opportunity to review the chal-
lenged conduct and rectify the situation if it deemed its actions were
not substantially justified. Requiring the party to exhaust such ave-
nues of inquiry forces the governmental entity to officially review
the appropriateness of its conduct earlier than at the point of litiga-
tion. As a consequence, much litigation may actually be avoided if
the introspection results in an adjustment of the improper govern-
mental action. Thus, the imposition of an "exhaustion" require-
ment would protect the interests of both the non-governmental
party and the United States.
In addition to resolving the President's concerns about the 1984
amendments, the legislators in 1985 also clarified other ambiguities
178. 131 CONG. REC. S9992 (daily ed. July 24, 1985) (remarks of Sen. Grassley).
179. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (d)(2)(D) was created to include the following definition: "'pos-
tion of the United States' means, in additon to the position taken by the United States in the
civil action, the action or failure to act by the agency upon which the civil action is
based .. " Substantially similar language is contained at 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(E).
180. 131 CONG. REC. S9992 (daily ed. July 24, 1985).
181. Id.
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inherent in the original Act, using the proposed 1984 amendments
as a foundation. Similar to the 1984 amendments, the 1985 legisla-
tion requires that no fee award determination be made until "a final
and unreviewable decision is rendered by the court on the appeal or
until the underlying merits of the case have been finally determined
pursuant to the appeal." '182 The 1985 legislation also parallels the
1984 amendments in that it makes EAJA explicitly applicable to
appeals before an agency board of contract appeals, confirms the
United States Claims Court's jurisdiction, makes the Act applicable
to Social Security claimants in adversary proceedings, defines cer-
tain parties in condemnation actions as being "prevailing," affirms
that fees can be collected for legal work performed prior to October
1, 1981, and expands the net worth limitations from $1 million to
$2 million for individuals and from $5 million to $7 million for des-
ignated business entities, including units of local government. 18 3
Several other ambiguities, however, remain unresolved and will
continue to be problematic unless and until Congress chooses to re-
consider the new Act. One somewhat latent ambiguity relates to
the standard of reasonableness regarding substantial justification.
The original legislative history of EAJA characterizes the substan-
tial justification standard as one of reasonableness, stating that no
fee liability attaches if the United States can demonstrate that the
legal and factual basis for its position is reasonable. 84 Although no
court openly challenges this standard, a number subtly vary from
it,"'85 usually in the direction of imposing a more stringent standard.
Congress included no specific language within the 1985 legislation
which addresses the applicable standard for substantial justification.
In the legislative history to the amendments, however, Congress did
address this matter but very briefly, and simply indicated that the
test for substantial justification is "more than mere reasonable-
ness."' 86 While somewhat directive, such treatment by Congress
does not amount to specific guidance. Congress should examine
and restate the Act's position regarding the "reasonableness" re-
quirement, expressly defining its boundaries.
Congress should also further explain the Act's position on pre-
182. 131 CONG. REC. S9996 (daily ed. July 24, 1985).
183. 131 CONG. REC. S9995 (daily ed. July 24, 1985) (remarks of Sen. Weicker).
184. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
186. H.R. REP. No. 120, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1985). The legislative history further
notes, however, that agency action found to be arbitrary and capricious or unsupported by
substantial evidence can be substantially justified in only the most extraordinary special
circumstances.
[Vol. 36:50
EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT
vailing party status. EAJA's legislative history reveals that Con-
gress intended the interpretation of prevailing party under EAJA to
be consistent with its interpretation under other fee-shifting stat-
utes. 187 In interpreting the Act, most courts relied on the accepted
standard under which a party prevails in an action if it is successful
on a significant issue which achieves some of the benefit sought
through the litigation."'8 Some variations and interpretive distinc-
tions, however, were apparent among the jurisdictions nominally
following this precept. Congress should, therefore, consider endors-
ing specific tests and standards for making prevailing party
determinations.
Congress should also consider specifying special classes of indi-
viduals as eligible for prevailing party status. In the 1985 legisla-
tion, as in the 1984 proposed amendments, Congress explicitly cited
parties in condemnation proceedings as being eligible for prevailing
party status under EAJA and included special guidelines for courts
to use when weighing such determinations."8 9 This is a helpful clar-
ification of a litigated issue. Congress should consider expanding its
list of special classes of individuals explicitly entitled to prevailing
party status. It should make clear, however, that the list is not ex-
clusive, but rather only indicative of the Act's breadth of scope.
Finally, three rather technical ambiguities could be clarified.
The first concerns party eligibility of a business entity. Since eligi-
bility depends in part on employing fewer than 500 employees,190 a
clear definition of "employee" would be helpful. The second con-
cerns clarifying whether a case is considered "pending" for pur-
poses of EAJA when the sole unresolved issue at the Act's inception
related to an attorneys' fee award.191 The third concerns an antici-
pated but yet unraised problem. Congress made clear in the 1985
legislation that cases falling within the Social Security Act, which
has its own fee provision, may also be subject to EAJA. 192 Con-
gress directed that attorneys may apply for fees under both statutes
but that double payment of fees to counsel is not intended.1 93 If fees
are received for the same work under both statutes, the smaller
187. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
189. See 131 CONG. REC. S9996 (daily ed. July 24, 1985); supra notes 146-47 and accom-
panying text.
190. See supra notes 29 and 36 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 130-34 and accompanying text.
192. See 131 CONG. REC. S9997 (daily ed. July 24, 1985); supra notes 151-55 and accom-
panying text.
193. H.R. REP. No. 120, supra note 186, at 20.
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amount must be given to the client. 94 Congress failed, however, to
specifically address whether counsel may obtain a fee award under
EAJA for time expended in the civil action and also collect fees
under the Social Security Act for time expended during the admin-
istrative portion of the case.
VI. CONCLUSION
In 1981, Congress implemented EAJA in an effort to remove the
deterrent of burdensome litigation expenses faced by individuals
and small businesses seeking to redress wrongs they have suffered at
the hand of the Federal government. Amendments, which would
have clarified some of the Act's ambiguities as well as extend its life,
were vetoed by the President in 1984. 1985 has produced new at-
torneys' fees legislation, placing liability on the United States for fee
awards in certain circumstances. This Article has devoted much
time and attention to the 1981 Act and its ambiguous provisions,
since the basis for the new legislation was essentially a reauthoriza-
tion of EAJA, encompassing much of the original Act and its pro-
posed 1984 amendments.
Congress should have utilized this opportunity, however, to step
beyond a mere synthesis of the original Act and its amendments,
and translated what it has learned during the Act's lifetime into a
more equitable and better-focused law. Specifically, an "exhaus-
tion" requirement engrafted onto the "position of the United
States" provision would address the concern for limitless liability
while at the same time effectively deterring improper government
conduct. Similarly, more precise definitions of the substantial justi-
fication standard of reasonableness and eligible prevailing parties
should be incorporated into the new legislation. These and other
clarifications of additional ambiguities would all serve to heighten
the promise which this fee legislation can offer.
194. See supra note 192.
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